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 1 
Political rights and multilevel citizenship in 
Europe 
 
Jo Shaw1 
 
 
Forthcoming in: S. Carrera and E. Guild (eds.), Illiberal Liberal States: Immigration, 
Citizenship and Integration in the EU, Ashgate, 2009 
 
Abstract 
The focus of this paper is on the rights of non-nationals to vote in local elections on 
the basis of residence, rather than nationality. This is already well established in the 
EU context, as a result of the introduction of local electoral rights as part of the 
citizenship package contained in the Treaty of Maastricht. A number of Member 
States go further and confer the right to vote in local elections on third country 
nationals as well, but this extension has by no means been universal. This paper 
explores some of the political and legal tensions which arise where there are debates 
and conflicts within states, across different territorial and political units, about 
whether or not to extend electoral rights to non-nationals. The paper seeks to explore 
the types of claims or arguments made for the exercise of regional or local autonomy, 
e.g. within federal states, in favour of extending electoral rights where the national 
policy is more restrictive. It emphasises in particular the significance of constitutional 
barriers in a number of states where experimentation at the subnational level has been 
attempted, notably Germany and Austria. It suggests also that the case for subnational 
experimentation can be linked, as it may be increasingly in Scotland as the UK’s 
current devolution scheme continues to evolve, to broader political questions about a 
state’s political and territorial settlement. 
 
Keywords 
Citizenship, immigration; federalism; devolution; voting rights; non-nationals; multi-
level governance; European Union; Member States. 
 
 
I Introduction: citizenship and immigration issues in multi-level 
governance systems 
In mature federations, debates often occur about which level of government should 
regulate (which) immigration issues.2 The core issue is whether immigration is an 
                                                 
1  Salvesen Chair of European Institutions, University of Edinburgh. Earlier versions of this 
paper were given at the IMISCOE Cluster B3 Conference in Warsaw, May 2007, at the 
Biennial EUSA Conference in Montreal, May 2007 and at a seminar at the Centre for Study of 
Law in Society, University of Sheffield, March 2008. I am grateful to the participants at these 
events for their comments, and in particular to Rainer Bauböck for providing comments on a 
draft version and to Bernhard Perchinig for input in relation to the case of Austria. 
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 2 
exceptional case (because of the link to the security of the state and to international 
diplomacy), or whether it should, in federal systems, be regulated using the same 
public law principles and applying the same arguments about policy efficiency and 
legitimacy as those which govern the allocation of powers between different levels of 
government in other policy fields, taking due account of regional variations within a 
territorially differentiated jurisdiction. Moreover, states within federations can also act 
as laboratories, or precursors to wider national trends. As Justice Brandeis famously 
once said: 
 
‘[I]t is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single 
courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try 
novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the 
country.’3  
 
There is, of course, nothing to suggest that in the case of immigration federalism, this 
would mean the adoption of policies which are necessarily more ‘favourable’ to 
perceived interests of immigrants (Wishnie, 2001). But they might, for instance, be 
directly reflective of the fact that a particular region or city within a state is more 
attractive to migrants and thus faces different constellations of issues to other parts of 
a state (Loobuyck and Jacobs, 2006). Thus the division of powers in the immigration 
field may be affected by the preferences of both sub-state regions and cities, and of 
migrants. Regions often view themselves and/or are treated as stateless nations within 
wider multinational states with specific interests in issues of economic development 
and demography which may differ from the rest of the state, and cities commonly 
regard themselves as transnational rather than national actors, whether in federal or 
unitary states. Cities, in particular, may be the chosen destinations of immigrants, 
rather than countries as such, not least because newly arrived immigrants often wish 
to join an established community in the host state of co-ethnics or co-nationals 
(Vertovec, 1998; DeVoretz, 2004; Bauböck, 2003). The political authorities of those 
                                                                                                                                            
2  For the discussion on immigration federalism, see generally Schuck, 2002; Huntington, 2007; 
Spiro, 2001; Boushey and Luedtke, 2006; Parlow, 2007; Su, 2008. 
3  New State Ice Co v. Liebmann, 258 U.S. 262 at 311 (1932), Brandeis J dissenting. 
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 3 
states, regions or cities will react differently to the political demands stemming from 
differing levels of immigration ‘demand’. Accordingly, a particular case may be made 
for the individual units within a federation or for large units such as cities to make 
autonomous decisions on the question of migrant selection as well the issues of post-
settlement integration with which they are more often already entrusted, because of 
political, geographical, demographic, cultural or social conditions.4 
 
Leaving aside more general questions about immigration federalism, the specific 
focus of this paper is on rights to vote and stand in elections as a resident rather than a 
national of the host state, and in particular the right to vote in local elections. This is 
just one narrow dimension of the immigration/citizenship complex within multi-level 
polities, where tensions can arise between the ‘federal’ authority and the subnational 
authorities as to which rights could or should be given to which different groups of 
immigrants and/or non-nationals. The question of the allocation of political 
participation rights in local elections combines difficult issues about the interface 
between settlement rights, access to nationality through naturalisation and residence, 
and integration within the host society more generally. The paper looks at the 
contestation of such rights across different levels of governance within the Member 
States of the European Union (‘EU’), but it places these rights in their wider EU 
context, taking into consideration relevant EU laws and policies governing the rights 
of EU citizens and third country nationals. 
 
Thus the paper builds upon an earlier study examining how electoral rights allocated 
at the EU level to EU citizens interact with the electoral rights granted (or denied) to 
non-nationals more generally at the national level (Shaw, 2007). The primary focus of 
the earlier study was the existing framework of electoral rights under EU law, which 
are applicable only to EU citizens. The rights enjoyed by EU citizens under Article 19 
and the implementing directives,5 which extend to rights to vote and stand under the 
                                                 
4  E.g. on language grounds, Quebec takes a different approach to Francophone speakers than 
does the rest of Canada. See DeVoretz et al, 2003. 
5  Council Directive 93/109/EC laying down detailed arrangements for the exercise of the right 
to vote and stand as a candidate in elections to the European Parliament for citizens of the 
Union residing in a Member State of which they are not nationals, OJ 1993 L329/34; Council 
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 4 
same conditions as nationals not only in municipal elections but also in European 
Parliamentary elections, provide examples of how the various regimes of rights 
enjoyed by EU citizens are dispersed across the supranational as well as the national 
levels. They can be seen as important exemplars of the wider principle of equal 
treatment, which complements the free movement rights enjoyed by EU citizens. The 
legal framework for this is provided not only by the citizenship provisions of the EC 
Treaty themselves, but also by other provisions of EC law such as Article 12 EC. The 
rationale for this legal framework focuses to a considerable extent on the fostering of 
integration of migrant EU citizens into the society and polity of the host Member 
State. 
 
In contrast, there is no ‘hard’ EU law governing the allocation of electoral rights to 
resident third country nationals at the national level, but there is some soft law 
encouragement. For example, DG Freedom, Security and Justice of the European 
Commission has produced a Handbook on Integration for policy-makers and 
practitioners, which seeks to establish best practice, drawn from examples across the 
Member States, in areas such as initial reception of immigrants and civic 
participation. It encourages Member States to extend local political rights to third 
country nationals using arguments about integration: 
‘The representativeness and democratic legitimation of policies is enhanced by 
extending formal political rights to immigrants. Where political rights exist, 
they need to be put into practice with commitment from all sides including 
political parties…At the local level in particular, electoral rights provide 
immigrants with political representation in decisions that affect their most 
immediate interest…Governments should grant electoral rights to all residents 
at least at local level and minimise obstacles to the use of these rights, such as 
fees or bureaucratic requirements. Immigrants can be encouraged to make use 
of electoral rights through information campaigns and capacity building, 
                                                                                                                                            
Directive 94/80/EC laying down detailed arrangements for the exercise of the right to vote and 
stand as a candidate in municipal elections by citizens of the Union residing in a Member 
State of which they are not nationals, OJ 1994 L368/38. 
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 5 
relying in particular upon the networks offered by immigrant organisations’ 
(DG Freedom, Security and Justice, 2004: 41). 
This, along with other similar statements emanating from the EU institutions,6 
supports the general proposition that electoral rights for non-nationals, at least at the 
local level, can usefully be seen as part of a pathway through a process of integration, 
rather than as a reward for integration already achieved, in the form of the acquisition 
of national citizenship. It is significant to note that this proposition has achieved 
recognition in a number of Member States, since around half of the twenty-seven 
Member States accord some or all third country nationals rights to vote, and 
sometimes to stand, in local elections, albeit not the states with the largest number of 
third country national residents (France, Germany, Italy and Spain). 
 
In this paper, the focus is on variation within states, rather than across them. A 
number of prominent examples of such variation do exist, such as Canada, Australia 
and – in a very limited way – United States, there are no examples of geographical 
variation in relation to local electoral rights for third country nationals amongst the 
Member States of the EU. The best European examples are to be found in 
Switzerland, which offers more generally an important example of a system of 
multilevel citizenship co-existing within a single state. Since citizenship operates at 
the federal, the cantonal and the local levels in Switzerland, those seeking to acquire 
Swiss nationality must seek admission at all of those levels, and there are important 
variations in relation to the acquisition of Swiss citizenship across the 200+ 
municipalities which have powers in this area (Helbling, 2008). There is variation also 
in the allocation of political rights. Article 39(1) of the Federal Constitution explicitly 
devolves the necessary competence to the Cantonal level, providing that: 
‘The Confederation shall regulate the exercise of political rights in federal 
matters; the Cantons shall regulate the exercise of these rights in cantonal and 
municipal matters.’ 
                                                 
6  E.g. Conclusions of the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member 
States on the establishment of Common Basic Principles for immigrant integration policy in 
the European Union, Doc. 14776/04 MIGR 105, 18 November 2004; European Commission, 
A Common Agenda for Integration Framework for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals 
in the European Union, COM(2005) 389, 1 September 2005; European Commission, Third 
Annual Report on Migration and Integration, COM(2007) 512, 11 September 2007. 
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 6 
Some Cantons regulate the matter directly, either by instituting local electoral rights 
for non-nationals (e.g. Fribourg, Jura, Vaud and Neuchâtel) or by refusing them (e.g. 
Aargau, Solothurn and Schaffhausen). A number of other Cantonal Constitutions, 
including those of Appenzell Ausserrhoden and Lucerne allow individual communes 
to introduce the right to vote, thus creating the possibility for a second level of 
variation, at the communal level. The issue has been regularly revisited and debated, 
as initiatives for referendums on the matter are brought before the various Cantons. 
 
In the United Kingdom, there is an interesting example of regional variation of 
electoral rights for EU citizens. EU citizens can vote in the elections for the devolved 
parliaments/assemblies of Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales, as well as in the 
elections for the London Assembly.7 This is because all of these elections are 
conducted on the basis of the electoral register that is compiled for UK local 
elections, not the national elections to the Westminster parliament. Pursuant to Article 
19(1) EC, EU citizens are on the local electoral register.8 These electoral rights are, 
however, emblematic of the UK’s emerging asymmetric federal system, because in 
certain parts of the UK, notably most of England, the analogous elected bodies for 
which EU citizens can vote (and stand) simply do not exist. 
 
Against the background of these observations, the empirical section of this paper will 
explore some examples of the contestation of electoral rights for non-nationals in the 
context of the multiple levels of political and legal authority which exist in the EU. 
The review does not purport to be comprehensive, but rather it presents a snapshot 
intended to tease out some preliminary conclusions about the different range of 
practices which occur in relation to electoral rights. The primary research questions 
are the following: What types of claims or arguments for the exercise of regional or 
local autonomy in relation to the political participation of non-nationals have been 
                                                 
7  The London Assembly has considerably fewer powers than the Assemblies in Wales or 
Northern Ireland. EU citizens can also vote in elections for the Mayor of London and other 
directly elected mayors in other towns and cities. 
8  S.3(1) of the Local Government Elections Regulations 1995 (SI 1995, no. 1948) provides the 
basic amendments to the local electorate to incorporate the requirements of EU law, and in 
relation to the inclusion of EU citizens in the ‘regional’ franchise see s.17 of the Greater 
London Authority Act 1999; s.11 of the Scotland Act 1998; S.10 of  Schedule 1 of the 
Government of Wales Act 1998; s.2(2) of the Northern Ireland (Elections) Act 1998. 
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 7 
developed in the EU Member States? Who have been the main actors in this context 
(political parties? NGOs?)? How have these arguments been received both at the 
subnational level and at the national level? What has been the impact of the broader 
‘European’ context provided by the limited framework of EU competences and 
activities in this field? And finally, what are the barriers to the experimentation which 
Brandeis suggests goes to very the essence of a federal system? Are they 
predominantly political or constitutional/legal in nature? 
 
II Contesting electoral rights at the subnational level in the multi-level 
‘euro-polity’ 
This section begins by looking at the link between evolving notions of subnational 
identity and possible re-definitions of the franchise at the subnational level in the UK, 
specifically in Scotland. Here the focus is on the general provocations to the definition 
of citizenship and associated rights which arise where the existing territorial and 
political settlement within a given state is under pressure from below. The UK is not 
unique in the EU in this context, and examples could also be drawn from the debate in 
both Spain and Belgium. The focus then shifts to EU Member States where there have 
in the last ten to twenty years been active campaigns and/or attempts, at the 
subnational or regional level to subvert restrictive national policies on the inclusion of 
non-nationals. In each case, the proposed more inclusive policies have faltered, often 
because of constitutional restrictions as well as the absence of political will at the 
national level. The paper takes a closer look at the cases of intrastate, 
intergovernmental competition which have occurred in this context, separating out for 
particular attention two federal states – Germany and Austria – where a 
constitutionally defined singular notion of the national demos has hindered 
subnational experimentation with political participation rights for third country 
nationals at the local level. 
 
a) Scotland in the UK in the EU: what scope for differentiated policies? 
The asymmetry in the electoral rights for EU citizens in the UK noted in the 
introduction raises the question whether there could in future be asymmetric 
development of electoral rights for third country nationals. At present, the electoral 
This is the Author’s Final Version of © Shaw, J. (2009). Political Rights and Multilevel Citizenship in the 
EU. In Guild, E., Groenendijk, K., & Carrera, S. (Eds.), Illiberal Liberal States. (pp. 29-49). Ashgate. 
 
Please refer to the published volume for citation purposes. 
 
 
 8 
rights of third country nationals in the UK are limited to the rights of Commonwealth 
citizens to stand and vote in all elections,9 thus excluding many large groups of third 
country nationals in the UK such as Americans. In particular, the question arises as 
whether local electoral rights for third country nationals could be instituted only on a 
UK-wide basis, or whether there are circumstances in which Scotland could choose its 
own policies in this area, but without moving to full political independence and the 
break up of the historic union with England. To put this question in context, it is 
useful to look at the broader history of political conflicts between Edinburgh and 
London since devolution over immigration and citizenship policies. Significantly, 
these predated the election of the minority Scottish National Party (SNP) government 
at the Scottish Parliament elections in 2007, and were visible also under the previous 
Labour-led coalition, albeit it in a more attenuated fashion. 
 
Asylum has been a core battleground in the UK where the issue of decentralisation 
has arisen. The UK is one of the many states which have used a policy of dispersing 
of asylum applicants, in the name of sharing the costs and the ‘burdens’ (Boswell, 
2001). In practice, this has created the scope for differences to arise within states over 
the politicisation of asylum questions. In relation to Scotland, for example, while 
immigration (and asylum) questions are reserved matters for the Westminster 
Parliament under the Scotland Act 1998, certain issues about the treatment of asylum 
seekers, and especially the forced removal of those who have been refused asylum, 
have been more heavily contested than in other parts of the UK. For example, policy 
on children falls within the remit of the Scottish Parliament. Political conflict has 
arisen as to whether so-called ‘dawn raids’ to remove those who have been refused 
asylum from the United Kingdom are traumatic experiences which infringe the rights 
of the child, and whether such removal, however effected, would also be liable to 
                                                 
9  The Representation of the People Act 1918 established the first truly modern franchise for the 
UK Westminster Parliament, abolishing property qualifications for men and introducing the 
franchise for (some) women for the first time. At the time it posited the franchise for ‘British 
subjects’, and when Ireland and what are now the countries of the Commonwealth became 
independent states, the franchise arrangements were preserved and updated, for example in the 
Ireland Act 1949. The relevant consolidating legislation laying down the general entitlement 
to vote is the Representation of the People Act 1983, as amended. For a review of the current 
scope of the franchise, see House of Commons Library Standard Note, Electoral Franchise: 
who can vote?, SN/PC/2208, 1 March 2005.  
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 9 
deny the children certain basic rights, such as the right to an education.10 The issue 
led directly to conflict between the Scottish Executive and the UK Labour 
Government in Westminster. When the Scottish (Labour) First Minister Jack 
McConnell sought some type of dispensation from the Home Office in London 
regarding the involvement of Scottish education and social service agencies in the 
making and implementation of deportation decisions,11 he was firmly rebuffed. In a 
political commentary in the Sunday Herald, a senior Scottish political commentator 
noted somewhat gloomily: 
‘If anything, McConnell’s brush with the Home Office has confirmed that 
Holyrood’s attempt to project Scotland as a welcoming place for foreigners is 
increasingly out of step with the clampdown implemented at Westminster.’12 
More recently the focus has been on the detention of asylum seekers, including 
children, with Scottish Ministers actively seeking the closure of the only asylum 
seeker detention facility in Scotland, although so far unsuccessfully.13 Scottish 
Government policy is also actively to seek the integration of asylum-seekers into the 
host community from the day they arrive in Scotland, including giving them the right 
to work.14 This is emphatically rejected in current UK policy. 
 
It is arguable that in other fields of immigration policy, while restricted in what it can 
do, the Scottish Executive (since 2007, renamed the Scottish Government) has been a 
little more successful. Historically, like Ireland, Scotland has been a nation of 
emigration. This has involved principally emigration to the rest of the British Isles 
(including the island of Ireland, especially Ulster) and to North America and 
elsewhere in the British Empire/Commonwealth. Immigration was largely confined to 
inward flows from Ireland, Poland and Lithuania especially after the second world 
war, from Italy, and in more recent years from England. Scotland’s population has 
                                                 
10  ‘Protest over refugee dawn raids’, BBC News, 17 September 2005, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/4254490.stm.  
11  ‘McConnell seeking asylum protocol’, BBC News, 22 September 2005, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/4269894.stm.  
12  ‘Holyrood Vs Westminster: the battle over asylum’, Sunday Herald, 27 November 2005; 
www.sundayherald.com.   
13  ‘After Dawn Raids…the new scandal’, Sunday Herald, 20 January 2007; ‘Dungavel set to 
close as Holyrood and Westminster pilot new detention scheme’, Sunday Herald, 3 February 
2008; www.sundayherald.com. 
14  ‘MacAskill clashes with immigration chiefs over reforms’, The Herald, 11 October 2008. 
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declined severely as a proportion of the overall population of the United Kingdom (as 
Scotland’s dwindled to around 5 million, England’s continued to grow), and its 
population (and population profile) has continued to decline (and to age) because of 
declining fertility and insufficient immigration to match the continuing emigration. 
Only in very recent years has the population of Scotland started to grow again, 
reaching an estimated 5.1 million in 2006. 15 A major contributing factor has been net 
inflows of EU citizens from the new Member States taking advantage of the UK’s 
decision not to apply transitional restrictions on labour market access. 
 
One of the major initiatives of the Scottish Executive in the early years of managing 
devolved government after the first Scottish Parliament elections in 1999 was to 
promote positively the image of Scotland as a migration destination. This has 
included some specific initiatives, such as the Fresh Talent initiative giving overseas 
students who have completed university courses in Scotland two year visa extensions 
to work in Scotland, without need to seek a work permit.16 Clearly, this was hardly a 
radical departure from broader UK policy which has long promoted a selective 
migration policy focusing on skills, especially in shortage areas and on those with 
entrepreneurial tendencies. Even so, Fresh Talent was a broader and less restrictive 
programme than what was available more generally in the UK, until it was assimilated 
into a UK-wide international graduates programme in the middle of 2008. 
Furthermore, with its promotional and informational website Scotland Is The Place,17 
which is also available in Polish and Chinese versions, the Scottish Government has 
been offering warm encouragement to migration to Scotland which has not been 
matched by the equivalent UK-wide websites.18 On the contrary, the public face of 
                                                 
15  Population statistics are available from both the Scottish Government 
(http://www.scotland.gov.uk/topics/statistics/browse/population-migration) and the General 
Register Office for Scotland (http://www.gro-
scotland.gov.uk/statistics/population/index.html).  
16  See the statement of First Minister Jack McConnell to the Scottish Parliament, 25 February 
2004, http://www.scotland.gov.uk/News/News-Extras/191. Scottish Executive, New Scots: 
Attracting New Talent to Meet the Challenge of Growth, February 2004. After two years, 
however, leave to remain has to be sought on the basis of the ‘ordinary’ UK rules. See 
Scottish Executive, Progress Report on the Fresh Talent Initiative, Scottish Executive Social 
Research, 2006. 
17  http://www.scotlandistheplace.com/.  
18  Compare the highly functional tone and focus of  the UK Border Agency’s Working in the 
UK website: http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/workingintheuk/.   
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the UK in relation to employment-related mobility often demonstrates the increasing 
‘fortress mentality’19 which now appears to pervade much UK policy in relation to 
immigration, border controls, and the treatment of foreigners more generally. The 
rhetoric in Scotland has focused firmly on settlement-based economic migration, 
whereas in the rest of the UK, especially the South East of England, the focus is 
increasingly on forms of circular migration with rights to permanent residence 
becoming ever more restricted. 
 
In the wake of the election of a minority SNP Government at the Scottish Parliament 
elections in May 2007, the issue of citizenship and immigration has inevitably 
received some attention. The Scottish Government’s consultative paper of July 2007 
unsurprisingly had a clear slant towards a solution premised on Scottish 
independence. Noting that powers relating to citizenship and immigration are powers 
reserved to the Westminster Parliament, it goes on to say: 
The United Kingdom Government’s policies on immigration and citizenship 
must reflect the situation across Britain, especially in the south east of England 
and London. In Scotland, there are very different economic, demographic and 
social issues relevant to population and immigration. Within the United 
Kingdom, it might be difficult to devolve responsibility for immigration and 
citizenship to Scotland, but increased powers to attract new migrants could 
allow the Scottish Government to address Scotland’s needs in an appropriate 
way.20 
The statement suggests that nothing short of independence will really do. However, it 
also reflects official SNP policy, which has been to campaign, even before 
independence, for a distinctive Scottish ‘green card’ to facilitate immigration.21 In 
fact, when the Migration Advisory Committee was established in 2008 to provide 
independent and evidence-based advice to government on specific sectors and 
occupations in the labour market where shortages exist which can sensibly be filled 
                                                 
19  D. Orr, ‘Open borders are the only alternative to the erection of a repressive fortress state’, 
The Independent, 26 July 2006. 
20  Scottish Government, Choosing Scotland’s Future. A National Conversation, August 2007 at 
p16. 
21  For details of current SNP policy on immigration and citizenship, see the SNP manifesto for 
the 2005 UK General Election: http://www.snp.org/files/SNP_manifesto_2005.pdf. 
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by migration, it accepted the principle that regional variation needed to be taken into 
consideration. When it produced its first list of shortage occupations in the summer fo 
2008, the MAC also added a short list of occupations with shortages specific to 
Scotland. At that level, it could be said that UK policy itself is moving a small way 
towards the position adopted by the SNP. 
 
Turning to the specific question of electoral rights for non-nationals, a review of the 
relevant legislative materials suggests at first blush that there is little scope for 
variation within the UK. Section B3 of Schedule 5 to the Scotland Act 1998 lists the 
powers reserved to the Westminster Parliament after devolution, so far as pertains to 
elections. The list reads: 
 
‘Elections for membership of the House of Commons, the European 
Parliament and the [Scottish] Parliament, including the subject-matter of-  
(a) the European Parliamentary Elections Act 1978, 
(b) the Representation of the People Act 1983 and the Representation 
of the People Act 1985, and 
(c) the Parliamentary Constituencies Act 1986, 
so far as those enactments apply, or may be applied, in respect of such 
membership.  
       The franchise at local government elections.’ 
 
This leaves very few powers to the Scottish Parliament in electoral matters, although 
the reference in the last line to local government elections means that the Scottish 
Parliament can make certain other arrangements (other than questions of the 
franchise) for local elections which deviate from the UK norm. Indeed, it did so 
recently in order to introduce proportional representation for Scottish local elections 
as of 2007.22 However, it is notable that a broader commission (the Arbuthnott 
Commission23) which looked at the conduct of elections more generally in Scotland, 
                                                 
22  Local Governance (Scotland) Act 2004. 
23  Commission on Boundary Differences and Voting Systems, Putting Citizens First: 
Boundaries, Voting and Representation in Scotland, January 2006 (available from 
www.scotlandoffice.gov.uk).  
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including voter participation and the co-existence of several systems of voting, was 
established not by the Scottish Ministers, but by the Secretary of State for Scotland – 
that is a Minister responsible to the Westminster Parliament. In sum, the Scottish 
Parliament is not permitted to change the franchise for any elections in Scotland, and 
could only be empowered to do so if the Scotland Act were amended. But while any 
change would indeed require primary legislation from the UK Parliament, there is no 
other UK constitutional bar to a wider franchise in Scotland. This point is reinforced 
by the fact that the current arrangements permitting EU citizens to vote in such 
‘regional’ elections in the UK are simply laid down in primary legislation making 
reference to the local government register.24 
 
That the current scope of the franchise should not be regarded as politically 
immutable in the longer term is confirmed by the fact that the franchise for putative 
‘Scottish’ elections has differed over the years. Under the Scotland Act 1978, which 
made arrangements for an earlier devolution scheme aborted when the initiative 
which failed to win sufficient referendum approval in 1979, s.4 provided that the 
persons entitled to vote as electors at the elections for the putative Scottish Assembly 
would have been those who had their names on the register of parliamentary electors, 
plus peers (i.e. members of the House of Lords). Members of the House of Lords are 
not entitled to vote in Westminster elections although they are entitled to vote in local 
government elections.25 Schedule 17 of the same Act laid down that the same groups 
of electors could vote in the referendum. 
 
A different definition of the franchise was used after 1997, both for the referendum 
which approved the creation of the Scottish Parliament and the subsequent elections.26 
The issue of the franchise was much discussed in both the House of Lords and the 
                                                 
24  Section 11 of the Scotland Act 1998. 
25  The Scotland Act 1978 was immediately repealed by the newly elected Conservative 
Government in 1979, after the failed referendum of 1 March 1979. The referendum was one of 
the factors contributing to the fall of the Labour Government, after it lost a vote of confidence 
on 28 March 1979. 
26  The issue of who should be able to vote in devolved Scottish elections was not discussed in 
the Kilbrandon Report of 1973 (Royal Commission on the Constitution, 1969-1973, Cmnd. 
5460), which was one of the main sources of inspiration when the devolution scheme of 1997 
came to be put in place. 
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House of Commons in 1997 during the passage of the relevant legislation, especially 
in relation to the question of who should vote in the referendum which approved the 
establishment of the Scottish Parliament. These electors were thought to be 
determining Scotland’s constitutional status in a post-devolution Union.27 Two key 
developments in relation to the local government and parliamentary registers between 
1978 and 1997 should be noted: first, the presence of EU citizens on the former since 
1993, and second, the presence of overseas (i.e. expatriate) voters on the latter. 
Expatriates were enfranchised in Westminster elections by the Representation of the 
People Act 1983, as amended most recently by the Representation of the People Act 
2000. This allows British nationals living overseas to register to vote for up to 15 
years after leaving the UK, in the constituency in which they were last registered as 
residents. 
 
Choosing the local electoral register as the basis for the franchise for elections in 
Scotland meant a focus on residence within Scotland rather than any other form of 
affinity with Scotland. It not only avoided the question of the affinity and belonging 
of those ‘expatriates’ who had moved outside the UK within the last fifteen years, but 
also avoided the question of the participation ‘rights’ of the very much larger Scottish 
diaspora comprising those who had left Scotland within the last fifteen years in order 
to reside elsewhere in the UK. To what extent should the ‘Scottishness’ of either 
group of expatriates give them a say? Should the expatriates born in Scotland, who 
have chosen to emigrate whether within or outside the UK, be given a stake in the 
future of Scotland? Do they have a better right to participate than those English 
‘incomers’ (i.e. those born and formerly resident in England, but now resident in 
Scotland)? It is not hard to see that such questions of affinity would be precisely those 
which a government committed to pushing through a referendum on a rather limited 
and localised concept of devolution in 1997 would want to avoid, given the presence 
of an active political movement for independence in Scotland. The parliamentary 
debates in 1997 reveal that the issue about expatriate voters was principally raised by 
                                                 
27  For examples of debates, see House of Commons Committee stage of the Referendums 
(Scotland and Wales) Bill, House of Commons Hansard Debates for 3 June 1997, Cols. 247 to 
278; House of Lords Debate, 3 July 1997, Hansard Debates, Cols. 321 to 344. 
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members of the opposition Conservative party in order, perhaps, to muddy the waters 
about what the significance of a devolution referendum might be for the future of 
‘Scottishness’ and of Scotland. Labour government ministers rather stressed that 
devolution was about residence and localism. It is clear from those debates that issues 
about the scope of the franchise have been clearly linked to questions of identity, even 
in the context of devolution. 
 
The same definition of the franchise, albeit for different reasons, is embraced for the 
putative referendum on independence which the SNP Scottish Government proposes 
to hold before the next Scottish Parliament elections in 2011. A draft bill was 
included in an annex to the National Conversation consultative paper28 and proposed 
that the local electoral register should be used as the basis for the referendum 
franchise. The paper justified this as follows: 
 
‘In the Scottish devolution referendum in 1997 entitlement to vote was based 
on residence in Scotland, which is the same as for local government elections. 
The draft Bill follows this model and does not attempt to define categories of 
people resident outside Scotland eligible to vote in the referendum, nor to 
exclude any people resident in Scotland from the poll. The draft Bill envisages 
an independent Scotland based on the territorial and political entity of 
Scotland, not on place of birth, or ethnic group.29 
 
This reflects also the approach of the SNP to citizenship acquisition after 
independence, whereby all long term residents would be accorded Scottish citizenship 
unless they opted not to acquire it.30 This would be combined with full toleration of 
dual nationality, and the preservation of the residence rights of those who opted not 
take Scottish nationality, as well as the rights of their children. Of course, not all 
                                                 
28  A National Conversation, above n.20 at pp44-48. 
29  A National Conversation, above n.20 at p35; the proposition about inclusiveness is clearly 
incorrect, however, as a minority of residents of Scotland would be excluded from voting in 
the independence referendum, because a number of (non-Commonwealth) third country 
nationals are not entitled to vote in local elections. The largest such groups would probably be 
US and Chinese citizens. 
30  See above n.21. 
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issues of citizenship, nationality and voting would be easy to resolve in the event of 
independence, as the experience of the new states which emerged in Central and 
Eastern Europe after 1989 has shown. This is all the more so because Scotland would 
be creating distinctions between insiders and outsider in the context of continuing EU 
membership, and in a context where Scotland has received large numbers of EU 
citizens exercising their free movement rights since 2004. While most of these 
questions lie beyond the scope of this paper, one difficult question is unavoidable. 
What would happen to the EU electors in pre-independence Scottish Parliament 
elections who refuse the offer of Scottish citizenship? At present, these electors have 
the right to vote for those with the power to determine policies, for example, on 
schools and hospitals in Scotland. Should they lose that right after independence just 
because they then would be voting in an election which also determined questions 
about defence and the national currency? Would it be compulsory for EU citizens, in 
those circumstances, to take up the offer of (dual) citizenship if they wanted to carry 
on voting, or would Scotland adopt the position that it has at the present time whereby 
EU citizens can participate in a significant elements of political decision-making, and 
extend that also to national (Scottish) elections after independence? 
 
Returning briefly to the headline research questions in order to conclude this section, 
some key points can be made. First, it is clear that the issue of voting rights in 
Scotland is subsumed within a broader debate about Scottish political futures, and 
about the future of the Union (i.e. the United Kingdom) more generally. While 
barriers to further experimentation under the existing legislation are clearly legal in 
nature, there would be no constitutional barrier as such to a change to the primary 
legislation establishing the devolution settlement in order to give the power to the 
Scottish Parliament to define its electorate in different ways to the rest of the UK (i.e. 
to include third country nationals). Furthermore, since the franchise used in devolved 
matters has been malleable in the past this indicates that change in the future might 
occur again. However, despite the heated nature of the debate in the UK about the 
future of Union and about the possibility of a referendum on Scottish independence, 
the issue of asymmetry or Scotland-level experimentation has not been the subject of 
extensive public debate hitherto. 
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b) Cities and states as laboratories? 
In the second part of this empirical section the focus is on cases of local level 
experimentation which have been driven by dissatisfaction with the prevailing 
national policy. These are cases where the issue is nested within a contested national 
debate about immigration and integration, rather than about political futures more 
generally. All of the cases reviewed are those where a subnational unit is contesting a 
restrictive national policy. However, quite conceivably, the positions could be 
reversed. 
 
In France, while the issue of electoral rights for third country nationals is regularly 
debated, a constitutional amendment which would be necessary to start the process of 
bringing about local electoral rights for third country nationals remains on the table 
within the French legislature. It has been consistently supported by forces of the 
political left,31 but it has not so far been adopted. The National Assembly adopted a 
draft law on the matter, but the draft has never completed the necessary legislative 
process in the Senate.32 In the light of these blockages, local level experimentation 
has been mooted as the alternative. Initiatives within municipalities to organise local 
referendums on giving the right to vote to third country nationals have, like other 
subnational initiatives examined in this section, been declared illegal as outwith the 
competence of the relevant subnational authorities,33 but they have been held on a 
consultative basis at the municipal level none the less.34 Civil society organisations 
                                                 
31  See the Socialist Party ‘manifesto’, Réussir ensemble le changement: Le projet socialiste pour 
la France, Part III, at 21: ‘We will grant the right to vote in local elections to resident non-
nationals who have been paying taxes for more than five years in our country’, 1 July 2006, 
www.projet.parti-socialiste.fr. 
32  See The Rights and Responsibilities of Citizenship, a report drawn up for the Goldsmith 
Review of citizenship in the UK by the British Institute of International and Comparative 
Law, at pp154-155. 
33  Judgment of the Tribunal Administratif Cergy Pontoise (1st chamber) 23 February 2006, 
Préfet de la Seine-Saint-Denis, req. n° 0511415, reported and briefly noted in Bulletin 
Juridique des Collectivités Locales n° 4/06, 257. 
34  A local consultative referendum was held on 26 March 2006 in the town of Saint-Denis; 31% 
of the electorate participated, and 64% voted in favour of extending the right to vote to third 
country nationals. 
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such as the Ligue des droits des hommes have also been very active in this context, 
organising symbolic votes on the issue of electoral rights for third country nationals.35 
 
Similar initiatives have been seen at the local level in Italy, in particular during the 
years of the centre right coalition government of Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi 
(2001-2006), which saw few developments at national legislative level in relation to 
the rights of non-nationals and immigrants. These have reflected the fact that Italy is a 
state with strong local identities. However, these local initiatives have come into 
conflict not only with the less generous national policies on immigrants’ rights, but 
also with the limits of current legal possibility. In August 2005, a Presidential decree 
struck down an amendment to the statute of the municipality of Genoa allowing 
electoral rights to third country nationals as contrary to the current law (Bencini and 
Cerretelli, 2005: 6). In an unlikely development, Gianfranco Fini, who was the 
principal architect of the notorious Fini-Bossi law tightening up Italian immigration 
law, appeared to put his political weight behind the proposition that third country 
nationals should have the right to vote in local elections in Italy.36 He probably knew 
that this was a largely symbolic gesture as it was hardly likely to come to fruition 
under Berlusconi’s rightwing government. Indeed, it did not. While the centre-left 
government which was elected in 2006 was notably more positive towards enhancing 
the rights of resident third country nationals, it fell from power before its proposed 
immigration law, which would have included local electoral rights for third country 
nationals, could be adopted. A general election victory then saw Berlusconi return for 
a third term as Prime Minister. Local/national tensions on the matter of the rights of 
third country nationals can therefore be expected to continue under this government.37 
 
Attempts at subnational experimentation have also been blocked in Germany and 
Austria. These two countries share a number of common features which make the 
comparison of the approaches taken particularly interesting. First, both have denied, at 
least until recently, that they are ‘countries of immigration’. Second both share a 
                                                 
35  For more details see http://www.ldh-france.org/actu_nationale.cfm?idactu=1110.  
36  E. Povoledo, ‘Immigrants in Italy get unlikely aid on voting’, International Herald Tribune, 
17 October 2003. 
37  For details of further local initiatives on immigration in Italy see Campani, 2007. 
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broadly ethnic definition of national citizenship. Third, since they are both federal 
states, intrastate contestation of electoral rights has occurred in the rather formal arena 
of the national constitutional court. Finally, in both cases, when faced with the 
challenge of locally led experimentation, the constitutional court has linked the local 
electorate firmly to a nationally defined concept of the demos, thus ruling out 
subnational attempts at reform. We will take each case in turn, beginning with 
Germany. 
 
Opinions have remained divided amongst commentators about the political 
significance of one of the causes célèbres of the constitutionally based distinction 
between Germans and aliens. These were the rulings handed down in 1990 by the 
German Federal Constitutional Court, annulling as unconstitutional two legislative 
schemes introduced at the level of the Land by the states of Hamburg and Schleswig-
Holstein which would have given electoral rights in local municipalities to non-
nationals who satisfied certain types of criteria regarding residence and attachment 
(Rubio-Marín, 2000: Ch. 8; Benhabib, 2004: Ch. 3; Joppke, 1999: 104-119; Neuman, 
1992; Béaud, 1992).38 
 
However, legally speaking, the significance is clear. The German Court relied upon a 
concept of popular sovereignty as the basis for political legitimacy, and linked this to 
a principle of a bounded Staatsvolk (or ‘state people’), limited by reference to the 
holding of national citizenship. It explicitly rejected the principle of affected interests 
as the basis for a claim to political equality and access to the franchise. The key 
section of the judgment reads: 
‘[the principle of popular sovereignty] in Article 20(2) of the Basic Law does 
not mean that the decisions engaging state authority must be legitimated by 
those who are affected by them; rather state authority must be based on a 
people understood as a group of persons bound together as a unity.’39 
                                                 
38  BVerfGE 63, 37 (Schleswig-Holstein); BVerfGE 63, 60 (Hamburg), 31 October 1990. In 
Schleswig-Holstein the rights would have been limited by a reciprocity clause. 
39  BVerfGE 63, 37 at 50 (my translation). 
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It also extended its conclusion about ‘state’ authority down to the level of local 
democracy, holding that municipalities, like the elected authorities at the state and 
federal level, wield state power. Not only did this rule out the Hamburg and 
Schleswig-Holstein initiatives, but it also meant that the implementation of Article 19 
EC subsequently required an amendment to Article 28 of the Basic Law. It confirms 
that any further steps towards political inclusion for non-nationals would likewise 
require constitutional amendments. While the possible question of enfranchising EU 
citizens to vote in Land or federal elections is not a live one in Germany at present, 
the question of enfranchising third country nationals certainly is (Shaw, 2007: 290-
306). In the shorter term, the Federal Constitutional Court pointed in the direction of 
the loosening of the rules on citizenship acquisition as the means of ensuring that in a 
more diverse Germany, with large numbers of persons not qualifying for German 
nationality under the historically restrictive conceptions which applied up to, and 
beyond, the date of reunification, pluralist political representation and voice is 
assured. 
 
This is what prompted Seyla Benhabib to understand the Court’s judgments as a 
‘swan song to a vanishing ideology of nationhood’ (Benhabib, 2004: 207), but equally 
as the trigger for a set of ‘democratic iterations’ involving other political and legal 
forces such as political parties, groups representing immigrants in Germany, and the 
legislative organs of the state which have resulted in changes to the rules on the 
acquisition of nationality which came into force in 2000. This perhaps understates the 
rather fraught nature of the domestic political debates about the amendments to the 
laws on citizenship and national citizenship acquisition, which resulted in a more 
limited compromise law being adopted. More recently still, in rules which came into 
force in 2005, Germany belatedly adopted something approximating to an 
‘immigration law’ for the first time (Bast, 2006: 3). Even that text has been highly 
contested, not least because of difficulties surrounding adoption. In sum, Germany’s 
‘democratic iterations’ have been extremely fraught at every turn in relation to issues 
of citizenship and immigration. 
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Against a policy and legislative background dominated by hostility to immigration 
and a strict definition of the conditions of access to nationality, it is hardly surprising 
that electoral rights for non-nationals, beyond the confines of EU law, have rarely 
been on the political agenda in Austria. According to an official of the Austrian Social 
Democratic Party (SPÖ) speaking in 2000: ‘Today there is simply not the political 
will to address the issue of voting rights at the national level’.40 Nominally, the SPÖ 
might be expected to be in favour of widening the suffrage, as is the case with many 
social democratic parties in the EU Member States. Indeed, they admit that ‘Our 
theoretical goal is close to the Greens, but in practice in the world of politics it is 
necessary to make compromises’.41 As the same interviewee indicated, the fear of 
losing political capital has restricted debate: ‘Between 1989 and 1993, with over 
120,000 immigrants in Vienna, no one within the SPÖ continued to talk about voting 
rights for third country nationals’.42 
 
Even so, the SPÖ in Vienna has been responsible for a more limited project to support 
the rights of third country nationals, in the form of the so-called Integration Fund 
which . This latter body developed a model for the city whereby immigrants could 
vote for a representative body which was then able to consult with the municipal 
council. The Steering Committee for the Fund was the Kuratorium, established by the 
City but since abolished as integration functions were mainstreamed into the City 
Council itself, as a specific responsibility of one unit within the city administration. It 
issued guidelines for the Integration Fund and determined its tasks and goals. It had 
15 seats, of which three were reserved for migrants and NGOs. The Greens and the 
Liberals had wanted this to be seven. The Fund focused on a diversity approach, 
rather than on the management of minorities, and its principal work was in the areas 
of social work, youth programmes and language courses (Krahler and Sohler, 2005: 
21-27 and 50-56; König and Perchinig, 2003: 13). 
 
                                                 
40  Interview with Robert Leingruber, International Secretary of the Austrian Social Democratic 
Party, Vienna, June 2000. 
41  Franz Jerabek, Office of the Fund for Integration and assistant to SPÖ City Councillor and 
Member of the City Government, Renate Brauner, Vienna, June 2000. 
42  For details of Austrian integration policy more generally see König and Perchinig, 2003. 
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Matters changed somewhat in Vienna after the election of a new SPÖ Land and City 
government in 2002, which formed an agreement with the Greens on a number of 
matters including a commitment to introduce electoral rights for third country 
nationals (Perchinig, 2005). This brought Renate Brauner, as the City Councillor 
responsible for integration matters, to centre stage. Brauner was an SPÖ member who 
had long campaigned on the issue of electoral rights, but who had previously been a 
more marginal figure until the coalition agreement with the Greens. An opinion poll 
amongst potential third country national voters conducted on behalf of Brauner and 
her colleagues indicated that 70% of potential third country national voters said they 
would use the vote if granted it (Krahler and Sohler, 2002: 52, referring to Jenny, 
2002). This suggested that the vote in municipal elections for third country nationals 
could effectively be seen as part of a larger integration strategy, binding the non-
nationals closer to the Austrian state and public authorities. Amendments were 
accordingly introduced to the relevant Viennese electoral laws to allow for voting by 
third country nationals with five or more years of residence in the 
Bezirksvertretungen. These community councils are the level at which EU citizens 
also participate in municipal governance within Vienna, since the Viennese city 
council doubles as a Land parliament and thus is excluded from the scope of the 
Article 19 voting rights.43 Such councils below the level of the city do not exist 
elsewhere in Austria, and indeed they are not mentioned at any point in the Austrian 
constitution. This raised the question of whether it was possible to permit third 
country nationals to vote in these elections under Austrian constitutional law, since it 
is clear from the constitution that voting for Gemeinderäte (the normal level of 
municipal councils) is reserved for Austrian citizens, with an exception being made 
for EU citizens pursuant to an amendment to implement the Treaty of Maastricht 
(Article 117).44 It is universally agreed, moreover, that voting in national and Land 
level elections is also reserved for citizens. 
 
                                                 
43  Judgment of the Austrian Constitutional Court of 12 December 1997, B3113/96, B3760/96. 
44  For brief notes on the application of Article 19 in Austria, see the regular national country 
reports for the EU Network of Experts on Fundamental Rights (CFR-CDR), most recently 
Nowak et al, 2005: 113. 
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In seeking to exploit this constitutional ‘space’ which it felt it had identified, the 
Viennese City Government found support for its approach from senior constitutional 
lawyers in Austria, including Professor Heinz Mayer of the University of Vienna 
(Mayer, 2002). He argued that as the Viennese Bezirksvertretungen are regulated by 
law at the level of the Land rather than the federal state, and since they exercise no 
legislative competences, they should not be regarded as general representative bodies. 
As such they would not be subject to the constitutional principle of the ‘homogeneity 
of the franchise’, which restricts the right to vote to in all elections to Austrian 
citizens. After the law was adopted in December 2002, it was subjected to a 
constitutional challenge before the Austrian Federal Constitutional Court by a number 
of members of the Christian Democratic (ÖVP) and Freedom (FPÖ) parties, who 
were sitting in opposition in the Viennese legislative body. The FPÖ, in particular, 
mounted a political campaign against the amendment, arguing that ‘a registration 
form (i.e. proof of residence) is too little’ for the right to vote, which should be 
reserved only for citizens.45 Its campaign included the use of posters displayed 
prominently in Vienna, emphasising that to be a true ‘Wiener’ or ‘Wienerin’, 
regardless of colour or ethnic background, an immigrant had to become an Austrian 
citizen. 
 
In the event, the Constitutional Court adopted a narrow interpretation of the 
constitutional possibilities under Austrian law, cutting off what had been put forward 
by proponents as a promising experiment to see whether third country national voting 
could contribute to the integration process in Austria (Nowak and Lubich, 2005: 80). 
As a matter of constitutional text and interpretation,46 the Court had no difficulty in 
first confirming that the electorate for national elections to the lower house of 
parliament (the National Council or Nationalrat), for regional elections to the 
legislatures of the Länder (Landtag), and for local elections to the municipal councils 
(Gemeinderat) is restricted in principle to Austrian citizens alone, subject to the 
requirements of Article 19 EC which are referred to in Article 117 of the Constitution. 
                                                 
45  See the brief report at http://www.wienweb.at:11111/content.aspx?menu=1&cid=47723. 
Photographic evidence also held on file by the author. 
46  VfGH 30 June 2004, G218/03. 
This is the Author’s Final Version of © Shaw, J. (2009). Political Rights and Multilevel Citizenship in the 
EU. In Guild, E., Groenendijk, K., & Carrera, S. (Eds.), Illiberal Liberal States. (pp. 29-49). Ashgate. 
 
Please refer to the published volume for citation purposes. 
 
 
 24 
However, this is not really an exception built into the Constitution as such, but rather 
a recognition of Austria’s internal national perspective on European Community law, 
which is to recognise its supremacy vis-à-vis Austrian law, even the Austrian 
Constitution. It emphasised the principle of the ‘homogeneity of the franchise’ in this 
context, whereby each level of government should be voted for by an identically 
defined electorate. Drawing upon what might be described as the ethos of nineteenth 
century nationalism (Perchinig, 2005: 10), the Court decreed that the rules on the 
franchise for the national, provincial and municipal levels of government are merely a 
specific example of the general principle stated in Article 1 of the Constitution 
whereby ‘Austria is a democratic Republic. Its law stems from the people.’ This 
‘people’ is the Austrian people, defined by citizenship.47 
 
Recognising that Vienna’s Bezirksvertretungen are not regulated by the Constitution 
but by state law, the Court none the less found that they are general representative 
bodies, in the sense that they are established by law to deal with matters in the public 
interest, not in the interests of particular groups or professions, and fulfil a function as 
representative organs of a defined territorial entity. Consequently, the principle of the 
homogeneity of the franchise must apply to them, even though in reality the ‘people’ 
or Volk which can vote for the Bezirksvertretungen, like the Gemeinderäte in the rest 
of the country, is constituted by Austrian citizens plus resident EU citizens from other 
Member States. Thus the Court gave no intrinsic weight to the re-definition of the 
‘people’ in terms of the impact of EU law, other than to recognise the qualification 
mandated by Article 19 EC. It stated that the exception to Article 1 brought about in 
order to give effect to Austria’s membership of the EU, whereby the law stems not 
only from ‘the people’, but also from the ‘organs of the (European) Community’, was 
‘irrelevant’ in this context.48 Consequently, the Court annulled as unconstitutional the 
amendments to the Viennese law on municipal elections which would have allowed 
third country nationals with five years settled residence to vote in elections to the 
Bezirksvertretungen. 
 
                                                 
47  VfGH 30 June 2004, at 47. 
48  VfGH 30 June 2004 at 48. 
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What was notable about the judgment was both the choice to include the 
Bezirksvertretungen within the principle of the homogeneity of the franchise and the 
paucity of references to EU generally (Nowak and Lubich 2005: 80). It simply 
dismisses the relevance of EU law to deciding the issue in relation to other groups of 
‘non-people’. Bernhard Perchinig (2005: 10) deplores the failure to refer to the 
development of concepts of citizenship in the EU context, including the notion that 
the rights and status of third country nationals resident in the Member States should 
be approximated as closely as possible to those of EU citizens resident in another 
Member State. In any event, the Court’s narrow conclusion on the reach of a 
nationality-defined concept of the ‘people’ as sovereign means that the 
Bezirksvertretungen elections cannot become a laboratory within which the city 
authorities in Vienna could experiment with different participatory mechanisms to 
promote the integration of non-nationals, in addition to naturalized citizens who are 
already included in the franchise. Indeed, naturalization is the only route to political 
inclusion in Austria for third country nationals, and unlike the German Constitutional 
Court, the Austrian Court made no reference to the political possibility of loosening of 
naturalization requirements as an alternative. On the contrary, the conditions of 
citizenship acquisition in Austria have tended to become tougher in recent years 
(Çinar and Waldrauch, 2006). 
 
III Conclusions and assessment 
It will be evident from the discussion in this paper that sub-national territorial units 
with autonomous or semi-autonomous powers and institutions of government, such as 
Scotland, the German or Austrian Länder, not to mention municipal authorities in any 
of the Member States, may seek to push the boundaries of the suffrage wider than 
they stand at national level for a variety of principled and instrumental reasons. In 
some cases, it may be because the party or parties controlling the relevant territorial 
unit differ sharply in ideology and approach to the national government, and those 
parties are seeking to use the opportunity of legal reform at the local or regional level 
in order either to emphasise their local ‘difference’ or to try to push for reform at the 
national level by showing an example of good practice. A form of inter-governmental 
intra-state competition can consequently emerge, and in that context it may well be 
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decisive how exactly powers are divided according to the relevant constitutional 
settlement regarding local self-government or devolution, and which organ of the state 
has the decisive power to determine who decides. Competition between different 
levels of government has already been a characteristic feature of struggles over 
electoral rights for non-nationals in several states. It is equally clear that central 
resistance to subnational variation is strong, and that arguments rooted in the division 
of powers within a constitutionally guaranteed system are frequently brought forward 
to justify that resistance and have been – in the case of Germany and Austria – allied 
to constitutionally defined notions of the demos. Thus, while many examples of 
experimental strategies can be seen in the EU Member States, none have in practice 
resulted in the type of subnational variation readily seen – and constitutionally 
mandated – in the Swiss Confederation. On the other hand, at the level of the EU and 
the Member States, variation is very evident, as the twenty-seven Member States have 
pursued very different pathways to accommodating immigrants and non-nationals 
within the political process. 
 
In terms of the different strategies followed by subnational units of government 
seeking to contest restrictive definitions of the franchise at the national level, two 
distinct themes can be seen. 
 
Some subnational regions may be consciously creating a space for migration within 
the polity, either by competing for greater numbers or specific types of migrants. This 
may or may not be associated with reinforcing a distinctive territorial identity, 
particularly one which is articulated through an active diaspora engagement 
programme (e.g. Scotland). Alternatively, such a policy may be limited to articulating 
a specific conception of how migrants ‘fit’ within the subnational territorial unit. This 
also offers a route to understanding the approach of a number of cities and 
municipalities referred to in this paper, all of which have tried to implement a broader 
and more inclusive notion of the demos through the medium of local electoral rights 
attaching to residence rather than nationality. 
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The second theme concerns the question of ‘best practice’ and the role of intrastate or 
intergovernmental competition within the state. In this context, the city or the region 
may lay claim to acting as a laboratory for integration, or it may be seeking 
specifically to influence the development of policy at the national level. However, we 
have seen how often such attempts may fall foul of notions of a common ‘national’ 
citizenship which has restricted all attempts in EU Member States hitherto to develop 
local electoral rights for third country nationals through local or regional level action. 
 
While it was never the objective of this paper to make the case for regional 
differentiation in electoral rights for non-nationals, or to argue for a broader or 
narrower conception of the franchise more generally, some concluding comments on 
the normative framework within which subnational variation could occur seem 
appropriate, by way of a final assessment. Reference was made at the outset to 
Brandeis’ notion of experimentation within federal frameworks, and indeed that spirit 
of experimentation could be said to be alive and well in the context of the patchwork 
of electoral rights for third country nationals which exist under national law across 
the EU Member States, especially when viewed against the backdrop of the EU’s 
expanding corpus of soft law measures seeking to encourage Member States to adopt 
the more inclusive norm. But variation within polities, whether within the EU, the 
Member States, or the third countries such as Switzerland, always comes at the price 
of uniformity, and can endanger other principles such as freedom of movement within 
the polity, or the notion of a common citizenship bond. It might, thus, demand a 
rethinking of the normative basis for citizenship, other than on a traditional national 
basis. As to the issue of free movement, this was one reason given for pushing to have 
a single EU rule on electoral rights for EU citizens after the Treaty of Maastricht 
(Shaw, 2007: Chapter 4). As to the question of citizenship as a common bond, 
speaking in the US context about the increasingly sharp debate on immigration 
federalism, Su reminds us that: 
 
‘Federalism issues can often be construed as disputes over membership rules. 
As a result, resolution of these cases often depends on the extent to which 
national citizenship and the constitutional core of our “Union” trumps the right 
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of states to exist and operate as distinct political (if not social or cultural) 
communities of interest…Under a system of governance based on “we the 
people,” it is difficult to imagine the existence of states as states apart from the 
membership that constitutes its communal and political existence’ (Su, 2008: 
20). 
 
Such principles have undoubtedly contributed strongly to a situation in which there is 
a great deal more debate about subnational variation of electoral rights within certain 
polities than there has been – at least hitherto – formal legislative or constitutional 
action. 
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